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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOBERT T. OTTLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LOlS R. HILL, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11112 
BRIEF OF RESP·Q·NDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
'rhis is an action brought by plaintiff against de-
ft.ndant for the wrongful death of one of his minor 
ehildren, Trent Lee Ottley. Plaintiff sought to recover 
special damages for hospital and medical in the amount 
of $1,180,80, funeral and burial expenses in the sum of 
$518.00 and general damages of $50,000.00. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'11he Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
.Judge Leonard W. Elon, tried the case sitting without a 
.inry and awarded plaintiff judgment of $6,697.26 rep-
!Ptot>nting general damages in the amount of $6,500 and 
oJl('<·ial damages in the amount of $197.26. The trial court 
1 
held that the proceeds for medical expenses undl•r a 
Blue Cross insurance policy, hospital expenses und1·r a 
Blue Shield insurance policy and funeral and burial l'\-
penses, under an automobile liability policy insure<l b: 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to 
plaintiff but under which the deceased minor child was 
an insured constituted an estate of the deceased hPnr·e 
plaintiff could recoYer as special damages only the dif-
ference between the total amount of the hospital, medical. ' 
burial and funeral expenses less the total amount pairl 
for these items under the various insurance policies men-
tioned which sum up the amount of $197.26. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower 
eourt affirmed as that judgment relates to the question 
presented by this appeal. 
STA'TEMENT OF F AiCTS 
Plaintiff, Robert T. Ottley, is the father of Trent 
Lee Ottley, a minor, now deceased. On June 22, 1961i. , 
at approximately 21st South Street and 1140 East Street 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, Trent Lee Ottley, age 4: ye;m, 1 
was struck by an automobile driven by defendant, Loi~ ' 
R. Hill; as a result of injuries received in the accidPut 
Trent Lee Ottlev died on June 2-1, 19GG. The> plaintiff. 
as the father o.f the decedent, brought this wronf('fnl 
death action against defendant seeking damages for ho~­
pital and medical expenses of $1,180.80, funeral expenol'' 
of $525.76 and general damages in the sum of $50,000.W 
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Upon the trial of the case plaintiff was awarded 
.indgment against defendant for the sum of $6,697.26 
n·presenting general damages of $6,500.00 and special 
damages of $197 .26. The trial court determined that the 
proceeds for medical expenses payable under a Blue 
Cross insurance policy, hospital expenses payable under 
a Blm~ Shield insurance policy, and for funeral and 
burial expenses under an automobile liability insurance 
policy issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance under which the dece'ased minor child was an in-
smed constituted an estate of the deceased and hence 
plaintiff could recover as special damages only an 
amount representing the difference between the total 
amount of the hospital, medical, funeral and burial ex-
penses less the total amount paid for these items under 
the various insurance policies. The amount representing 
the difference of the two amounts was $197.26. 
The Blue Shield policy contains the following pro-
\'ISIOnS: 
This Contract made between the Subscriber 
named on the application, which is made a part 
hereof, and the Medical Service Bureau of the 
Utah State Medical Association, Incorporated, 
acting as the authorized representative of and for 
the participating physicians therein, entitles the 
Subscriber and family dependents ... to have ... 
services from the participating physician of their 
choice. 
ARTICLE I 
A. "Contract" means that this document and your 
identification card and application card, and 
includes the endorsements and attached pa-
per~, if any, all of which shall constitute the 
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contract between the Medical ServieP HnrPa
11 
of the Utah State Medical Association, Incur ' 
porated and the Subscriber. 
B "S b .b " . u sen er means any person to whom tlw 
Medical Service Bureau of the Utah Stat" 
1 
Medical Association, Incorporated shall fa~1w 
a contract. 
* * * 
D. "Member" shall mean the Subscriber and Jii, 
or her ''Family Dep€ndents" who arP his or 
her spouse and any unmarried legally de1H·nd-
ent child of either or both the subscriber all\] 
spouse under nineteen years of age whose 
name is listed on the subscriber; application. 
The Blue Cross insurance policy has the follo\\'-
ing provisions : 
CONTRACT TYPE J AK 
Issued by 
Blue Gross of Utah 
A Non-Profit Hospital Service Plan Corporation 
herein called plan 
In consideration of your enrollment and the Jlll)-
ment of the dues as provided herein, the Plan 
hereby agrees to furnish hospital c;are as herein-
after defined to holders of the type identificatiou 1 
card described 'above issued in connection 'rith 
this contract, for Subscribers, and to Family De-
pendents listed with the Plan, all in accordance 
with the terms and conditions o.f the Contract 
herein provided. 
* * * 
A. "Contract" means this document and yonr 
identification card, and includes the endor:>1L 
ments and attached papers, if any, all of wltiel 1 
shall constitute the contract behYeen tlw Bh1 1' 
Cross of Utah and subscriber. 
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B. "Subscriber" means any person to whom Blue 
Cross shall issue a contract. 
" " " 
D. "Member" shall mean the subscriber and his 
or her "Family Dependents" who are his or 
her spouse and any unmarried legally depend-
ent child of either or both the subscriber and 
spouse under nineteen years of age whose 
name is listed on the subscriber's application. 
The automobile liability insurance policy issued by 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company pro-
vides as follows: 
Coverage C-Medical Payments. To pay reason-
able medical expenses incurred within one year 
from the date of accident: 
Division 1. to or for the named insured and 
each relative who sustained bodily injury, 
caused by accident, while occupying or through 
being struck by the owned automobile, or any 
other land mofor vehicle or trailer .... 
Limit of Liability_JOoverage M. The company's 
limit of liability shall not exceed $1,000 for fun-
eral expenses incurred for all expenses incurred 
for each person who sustains bodily injury in any 
one accident. 
Definitions-Insuring Agreements I and II 
Named Insured - means the individual so desig-
nated in the declarations and also includes his 
spouse, if a resident of the same household. 
Insured - under Coverages A, B, C and M, the 
unqualified word "insured" includes (1) the 
named insured, and also includes (2) his rela-
ti \'es, .... 
Relative - means a relative of the named insured 
who is a resident of the same household. 
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Trent Lee Ottley, the minor child, was the flon uf 
plaint~ff and a resident of the same household. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO INCLUDE IN PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT 
THE FULL AMOUNT OF SPECIAL DAM-
AGE1S FOR HOSPITAL, DOCTOR, FUNER-
AL AND BURIAL EXPENSES. 
Under Point I of its brief, appellant has dealt with 
subheading (a) The claim for hospital, doctor, fnnt-ral 
and burial expenses is a direct and primary claim of tlw 
father, for which he is entitled to recover. Respondent 
respectfully asserts that while the authorities cited by 
appellant in subheading (a) may be the law, they an 
inapplicable in this situation. 
The general rule of law seems to be that wh<'re an 1 
action is brought by a parent or child for personal in 
juries to the latter and a claim is made for the expen~e> 
necessarily incurred in curing or attempting to cnre tlll' 
injuries e.g., professional services of physicians and 
nurses, medicines, hospitals, etc., if the parties are in t111, ' 
usual situation with respect to recovery of said exrwnw, 
the parent and not the child may recover the damagPf. 
37 ALR p. 29. The annotations ref erred to cites cases 
from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Comwdi· 
cut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
l\Iichigan, 1\liunesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hamµ· 
;;hire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
1 ania, 8outh Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
\foshington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, England, and 
Canada; however, each case discussed and ref erred to 
relatPs to the right of the parent to recover from the 
tortfeasor that causes injury to the child when the infant 
l1ad no estate. 
'l'he question presented in the case is not whether 
the infant or his personal representative may recover 
co:,;ts of hospital, medical, funeral and burial expenses 
from the tortf easor under the case law, but whether the 
infant or his personal representative may recover such 
expenses from a third party non tortf easor under a con-
tract permitting it to do so. 
It should be noted that plaintiff, Robert Ottley en-
tm~d into several contracts providing various kinds of 
insurance which policies gave protection to any member 
rif his family thus giving them the right to demand bene-
fits thereunder. For example, Trent Lee Ottley was a 
111emhPr of the Plan under both the Blue Shield and Blue 
Cross policies and as such member was entitled to all 
tlip hc'nefits provided for him thereunder. In the event 
of his death his personal representative would be entitled 
to the same rights that the child had, i.e., for payment 
of hospital and medical expenses resulting from his 
1nJnry. 
Under the policy of automobile insurance issued by 
Ntate Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to 
11laintiff, Trent Lee Ottley, was an insured and as such 
J11Tsonally entitled to all the rights provided for him 
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thereunder. As an insured under the policy of im;uranl'i· , 
issued by State Farm Mutual Automobik• lnsurant'I· 
Company and as a member of the Plan provided by Luth 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Trent Lee Ottley, liy and 
through his guardian ad litem or the infant's personal 
representative could bring an action directly against \hi• 
insurers to compel payment of benefits on behalf of the 
infant. The right to the benefits and the proceeds pay-
able under the policies of insurance constitute an l'HbtP 
of the infant out of which the expenses of his last illness 
and burial must come. This was the basis of the ruling 
of the trial court and rightfully so. 
Subheading (b) of Point I of Appellant's hriPf i> 
completely immaterial to the questions presented in thi,. 
appeal since the father of the deceased infant may re-
cover from the tortfeasor for the costs of hosital, medi-
cal, funeral and burial expenses only if there is no estate 
left by the deceased. 
Title 78, Chapter 11, Section 6, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, relates to legal action by a parent or guard-
ian against an alleged tortfeasor for the death of a 
child. The applicable provisisons of that statute are a~ 
follows: 
". . . a fa th er, or in the case of his death or 
desertion of his family, the mother, may maintaiu 
an action for tlw death or injury of a minor chil1l 
when such injury or dc•ath is causPd by the \\l'011r 
fnl act or nPglect of another .... " 
'ritle 78, Chapter 11, 8ection 7 makPs proYision for 
legal action in cases of death of an adnlt and compan' 
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f:l\oralilP, in content and m the rationale behind it, to 
/!i-11-() lJ.C.A., 1953. 
1Ttah Code Annotated, 1953, 78-11-6, gives the parent 
(lt p('rsonal representative of a deceased minor child a 
, uuse of acti011 for the wrongful death of the child. As 
u10~,t states do with the same or similar statutes, Utah 
Jimit':i the recovery of the parents to the amount they 
~nffrr as a direct loss to themselves. 
In Ilf cads 1,'S. Dibblee, 10 Utah 2d 229, 350 P. 2d 
~;l;) (19GO) the court held that the parent of the deceased 
minor was entitled to recover for the earnings of his 
chiU, for the society of the child and the amount he may 
Jia,·c received as support in his old age from the child. 
~pn•ral other cases in Utah have construed the so-
C'Ctlled child wrongful death statute and although they 
arP not squarely in point with the problem presented 
li<'rPin, the rationale and holdings of the particular cases 
m·ll assist in solving the instant question. 
H c nrie vs. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, 
ll'.:l Utah 415, 19G P. 2d 487 (1948) involved a situation 
1rlien' a 16 year old boy was killed while operating a 
ll<'gligently maintained elevator. The court held that 
[Jn~·mcut of part of the burial expenses of the deceased 
lliinor Pmployee, who left no dependents, and $1,000 in 
11i 1• stah~ treasury in accordance with an order of the 
1rnfostrial commission as provided by Title 35-1-68 (1) 
I .l'.A., 1953 constituted payment of "compensation" 
11 i1l1m thP meaning of the Utah Constitution, Art. XVI, 
Section 5. It was further held that the claim of the iiar-
ent under the wrongful death statute is abrogated wh1,n 
compcnsation for injuries resulting in death is provide<l 
for by law as in the Workmen's Compensation Act. How-
ever, the reason for this holding undoubtedly is that 1he 
Workmen's Compensation Act provides an alternatiw 
proceeding for the collection of damages for the death 
or injury of a workman and precludes any civil action 
against the tortfeasor in such a case. 
The provisions of 78-11-7 U.C.A., 1953 have been 
construed by the Utah court as to what can be recowred 
by the plaintiff in actions instituted under the statute. 
Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772 
(1943) involves the amount of damages recoverable 
under the "adult wrongful death" statute. Plaintiff's 
wife was killed in an automoblie accident in which dr-
fendant was guilty of negligence. The court held that 
before plaintiff may recover for funeral expenses in an 
action under this statute, he must show that the estate 
is insolvent and unable to pay such funeral expenses, 
and that plaintiff or one of the heirs has paid or that he 
has entered into a legally enforceable obligation to pay 
the funeral expenses. The rationale of the court was 
to the effect that the estate is not a party to the action 
under the wrongful death statute since the statute 
creates a new cause of action in favor of the deceased 
person's heirs. 
The only other Utah case discussing recoypry of 
funeral and medical expenses is In re Behm's Estate,·· 
Utah , 213 P. 2d 657 ( 1950). An action was brought by 
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tltt' Jnrnband against the doctor who had caused the death 
of his wife during childbirth. In deciding the matter, the 
eomt followed the rule established in Morrison vs. Parry, 
Supra, and held that from the proceeds realized under 
the claim for wrongful death, plaintiff, husband, was 
c·ntitled to recover the amount expended on his wife's 
last illness and burial where the wife left no estate and 
tht' husband proved that he had paid said amount. 
~ven though the cases cited in relation to recovering 
all t'xpenses of the last illness and burial of decendent 
have been in the construction of the provisions of 78-11-7, 
FC.A. 1953, and not specifically of 78-11-6, U.C.A., 1953, 
the rationale behind the cases certainly applies to and 
is valid in construing the last named statute. 
'l'he question then arises as to whether or not the 
proet'eds payable under an insurance policy or policies 
for hospitalization, medical and burial expenses of de-
Ct><lPnt are part of or constitute an estate of the decedent. 
No casP deciding this exact point has been discovered. 
One can certainly argue, and with a good deal of merit, 
it seems, that if the decedent would have had a claim 
directly against the insurance company for the payment 
of hospital, doctor or medical expenses, then a fortiori 
the cl0im which the decedent has would be an asset of his 
P~tatP and a claim which could be prosecuted by the ad-
rnini8trator. 
However, if the provisions of the policies involved 
<·ontain provisions which merely reimburse the parent 
i'or hospital, doctor, and medical payments of his minor 
d1ild, tlwn the minor child would not have a direct claim 
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against the insurance compan~- and hence, neitliPr \rnnld 
his estate. 
The case of D01i~at i1s. Great American l11!fr11wil1t 
Company, et al, 130 So. 2d 805 (19Gl) deals with a kin 
dred question as that involn'd in this m<•mormHlrn 11. 
Louisiana has a similar wrongful death statute to that 
of Utah. This was an action for damages arising ont of' 
a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff's father was 
killed. Defendants were the owner and driver of the 
truck involved in the accident and, Great Amt>rican In-
demnity Company, the public liability and medical pay-
ments insurer of the truck. 
Plaintiff demanded damages for pain and 1-mffrring 
of decedent prior to his death, for loss of love and torn-
panionship of the decendent, and for funeral expenses 
incurred as a result of the accident. The trial court 
awarded plaintiff damages for loss of lov<> and com-
panionship and $1,237.50 for funeral expenses, but re-
jected her demands for the alleged pain and suffering ol' 
decendent prior to his death. Plaintiff appealed from 
the judgment, and defendants answered the appeal pray- ' 
ing that the awards be reduced. 
Apparently the liability insurance policy proYided 
for funeral expenses coverage under a "medical pay-
ments" clause, under which the insurer obligated itself 
contractually to pay reasonable medical or funeral PX-
penses ''to or for each person who sustains bodily in-
jury," and in addition it was obligated to pay for any 
tort damages for which the insured was liable. 
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1 n n·lation to the fnneral expenses incurred in con-
rn·dion with the death and interment of decedent, the 
t'\ idence revealed the following amounts: 
Hixson Funeral Home --------------------$892_50 
I:Sscude FnnPral Homes __________________ 125.00 
Louis Gagnard, Yault ____________________ 120.00 
A. Normand, Monument ________________ l00.00 
GrPat American Indemnity Company paid the amounts 
due Hixson and Escude funeral homes amounting to the 
nggn·gatc snm of $1,017.50, and plaintiff paid the re-
maining bills of $220.00. The payments made by de-
frndant insurer were made under the "medical pay-
ments" clause of the policy covering the truck in which 
drccllent was riding as a passenger. 
Plaintiff contended that she was entitled to recover 
the full amount of the funeral expenses under the public 
liability f Patures of the policy, even though a substantial 
portion of them had already been paid by the insurer. 
DPfondant contended that the trial judge erred in award-
ing- plaintiff the full amount claimed for funeral ex-
lH'nses. 
Plaintiff testified that her father's body was at the 
funeral home when she learned of his death and that she 
\\ l'nt there and made arrangements for the funeral. She 
also 1c·8tified, however, that she did not pay the amounts 
dut• th<> Hixson and Escude funeral homes for the funeral 
~nvi<'<>8 rendered by them, and that she never received 
a hill from either of the establishments for those services. 
Tl1c> n·cord showed that the statement submitted by Hix-
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son Brothers was addressed by "Mr. Robert Mayeaux 
Estate." 
The Court was of the opnuon that plaintiff had 
failed to establish that she had obligated herself lWrson-
ally to pay the particular accounts referred to, stating 
at 130 So. 2d 308: 
"In the instant case th<c're is no legal liability on 
the part of plaintiff to pay the funeral expe.nsl'S 
of her deceased father. She has not paid those 
expenses, they have not been paid with funds lw-
longing to the succession with a resultant n'dnc-
tion in plaintiff's inheritance, and no further dl'-
mand for payment can be made against decedent's 
sncccssion since the debts have been paid." 
Since plaintiff had actuall~- paid thl' amounts dul' 
Garnard and Normand in the sum of $220 she was en-
titled to recover that amount from defendants. 
The case seems to say that if there are insurance 
proceeds to pay for funeral expenses of decedent there-
by relieving decedent's estate and his heirs from the 
obligation of paying those expenses then any amount 
paid by the insurance carrier cannot be recovered hy 
plaintiff since he has not been subjected to any finanrial 
detriment. By analogy the same principle can be ap-
plied to the payment of hospital, doctor and medical 
payments made pursuant to an insurance policy. 
One distinction between the instant case and that of 
Dauzat vs. Great American Indemnity Cmnpany, is that 
in the latter case neither decedent nor any of his heirs 
had paid any insurance premiums to defendant insurrr, 
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an<l in the former case the father of the deceased infant 
Jias paid insurance premiums on both the health and 
accid(mt and the automobile liability insurance policies. 
'rhe annotation discussed by Appellant at Page 9 
of its hrief found at 13 ALR 2d 355 entitled "Hospitali-
zation and Medical Insurance as Affecting Damages re-
coverable for injury or Wrongful Death" is not in point. 
'J'hat annotation deals with the damages recoverable by 
the injured party from the tortf easor where his loss is 
wholly or partially indemnified by insurance and has 
110thing to do with the question to be resolved in this 
matter. There the discussion goes to the collateral source 
rule and not whether the benefits payable under insur-
ance policies to an insured constitute an estate. 
CONCLUSION 
Jn conclusion it should be reiterated that no case in 
any jmisdiction has been found that is squarely in point 
with the question presented herein. It is clear, however, 
from the Utah cases that if decedent left no estate and 
his heir or heirs were legally obligated to pay his ex-
penses of last illness and burial, then such expenses can 
lw claimed and recovered in a wrongful death action 
against the tortfeasor. The law is not so clear where 
tlH•rp is an insurance policy or policies which provides 
for payment of those expenses for a decedent whether 
hl> lw a named insured, an insured or a beneficiary under 
the policies. That the claim by the personal representa-
ti1e of decedent against the insurance carrier for pay-
15 
ment of these expenses is a chose in action forming an 
estate of decedent to the extent of the monetary value 
of the claim is certainly a reasonable and meritorious 
position, and this argument fortified by the rational1· 
in the Douzat case to the effect that payment of funeral 
expenses by an insurance carrier under a policy obli-
gating it to do so does not result in a financial detriment 
to decedent's heirs, inasmuch as no legal obligation 
arises on their part. Neither is the estate diminished, 
since payment is not made by it. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that plaintiff can-
not claim any amounts paid for hospital, doctor, medical, 
and funeral expenses for his minor child which haw 
been paid under his health and accident and the medical 
coverage of his automobile liability insurance policies. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
Carman E. Kipp 
D. Gary Christian 
Attorneys for Defcnda11t 
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